INTENTIONALISM, HISTORY, AND LEGITIMACY*
JOHN J. GIBBONSt

In 1987 the American public was witness to extended coverage,
on national television, of a seminar on appropriate methods of
constitutional interpretation. 1 The leading participant in that
seminar was, of course, Judge Robert H. Bork, whose nomination
to the Supreme Court was then the subject of hearings conducted
by the Senate Judiciary Committee. With eloquence, passion, and
considerable erudition, Bork espoused the view that the only
legitimate interpretive posture forjudges is a search for the original
intention of the constitutional draftsmen, as expressed in the
language of the text. Any other approach to interpreting the
document, he contended, casts judges in the role of lawmaker
rather than that of neutral arbiter. Bork was particularly offended
by the Supreme Court's recognition of certain individual autonomy
interests as constitutionally protected against regulation by the
democratically chosen branches of our federal and state govern2
ments.
Other witnesses who came before the Committee, and some of
the Senators themselves, with passion equal to the nominee's,
though occasionally less erudition, insisted that Bork's original
intent version of the judiciary's role in constitutional adjudication
was deeply flawed. For these participants in the great seminar, the
Constitution could have no static meaning. 3 It could only be read

* This paper is adapted from the Owen J. Roberts Lecture delivered at the
University of Pennsylvania on February 21, 1991.
t RichardJ. Hughes Professor. of Constitutional Law, Seton Hall University Law
School. Retired ChiefJudge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
B.S. Holy Cross College, 1947; LL.B. Cum Laude Harvard Law School, 1950.
The confirmation process that produced the seminar on intentionalism has itself
been the subject of extensive and impressive commentary. See Symposium, Essays on
the Supreme Court Appointment Process, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1146 (1988).
2 See Nomination of Robert H. Bork to Be AssociateJusticeof the Supreme Court of the
U.S.: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on theJudiciay,100th Cong., 1st Sess. pts. 1-5,
at 115 (1987) (statement ofJudge Bork) ("[T]hejudge has no way to [decide among
competing societal interests] and the matter should be left to the legislatures who will
then decide which competing.., freedom should be placed higher.").
3 See, e.g., id. pt. 4, at 4124 (statement of Marvin E. Frankel, American Jewish
Coigress) ("[T]he great text must be understood and adapted to serve a living nation,
and ...

its provisions must not be read with narrow literal-mindedness ....

The

words of the Constitution are thus informed by the experiences of the intervening
decades and centuries.").
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as Justice William J. Brennan read it, in a manner "sensitive to the
balance of reason and passion that marks a given age," 4 and with
an awareness of the particular balance we strike "as Twentieth
Century Americans.

"5

The positions on view in the Bork hearings represent extremes
in the range of conceptions of appropriate Supreme Courtjurisprudence. The outcome of their clash in 1987 was a defeat, if perhaps

a temporary one, for the proponents of intentionalism. When the
discussion renewed in hearings on the confirmation of Justice
AnthonyJ. Kennedy, some of the passion had been spent, and the
jurisprudential extremes were less clearly articulated.6 By the time
ofJustice Souter's confirmation hearings, when a different President
still spoke of the illegitimacy of any interpretive posture which
would permit judges to make law binding the other branches of
government, 7 the nominee was careful to avoid espousing any
8
extreme position.
One conclusion that might be drawn from the contrasting

outcomes of the Bork and Souter confirmation hearings is that the
issues raised by pleas for a constitutional jurisprudence of original
intention are no longer of great moment. The Senate's resounding
rejection of Judge Bork's nomination might be considered definitive, a once-and-for-all repudiation of intentionalism by the elected

4 William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and "The Progress of the Law," The
Forty-Second Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture (Sept. 17,1987), in 42 REc. ASS'N B. CITY
N.Y. 948, 966 (1987).
5 William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratffication, 43 NAT'L LAW. GUILD PRAC. 1, 7 (1986).
°See Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to Be AssociateJustice of the Supreme Court
of the U.S.: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary,100th Cong., 1st Sess. 139
(1987) (statement of then-Judge Kennedy) ("[W]e can follow the intention of the
framers in a different sense. They did do something. They made certain public acts.
Thel,wrote. They used-particular words. They wanted those words to be followed.").
See, e.g., President's Remarks Announcing the Nomination of David H. Souter
to Be an AssociateJustice of the Supreme Court of the United States and a Questionand-Answer Session with Reporters, 26 WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 1143, 1143-44 (July
23, 1990) (statement of President Bush praising then-Judge Souter for "recogniz[ing]
the proper role ofjudges in upholding the democratic choices of the people through
their elected representatives with constitutional constraints").
8 Indeed, he was at some pains to avoid taking any position at all when he could
avoid doing so. See, e.g., Nomination of David H. Souter to Be AssociateJustice of the
Supreme Court of the U.S.: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciay, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 212 (1990) (statement of then-Judge Souter) ("I think to answer that
question [regarding the morality of abortion] and to get into a matter of personal
morality of mine, when it would not affect myjudgment, would go far to dispel the
promise of impartiality in approaching the issue, if it comes before me.").
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body entrusted with the authority to establish the prerequisites for
admission to the Supreme Court. So considered, the Senate's
action shows a surprisingly unenlightened sense of self-interest.
The most frequently heard objection to interpretive approaches that
permitjudges to look beyond original intention is the undemocratic
character of judicial review, the way it frustrates expression of the
will of the people through their elected representatives. 9 Why,
then, would (elected) Senators choose to reject a forceful defender
of a constitutional doctrine devoted to maximizing the power of
elected office holders? Our assumptions about the heady influence
of power, and our knowledge of the power that comes with national
office in this country, 10 lead us to expect that these happy few will
not willingly surrender what they have won. Moreover, the
relationship between the Supreme Court and Congress over the
years has often been tense: one need only recall legislative reactions
9 See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-17 (1962)
("[T]he reality [is] thatwhen the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional alegislative

act or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of representatives of the
actual people of the here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf of the prevailing
majority, but against it."); JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 4 (1980) (noting
the difficulties one encounters "in trying to reconcile [judicial review] with the
underlying democratic theory of our government"); Robert H. Bork, Tradition and
Morality in Constitutional Law, in AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY
RESEARCH, THE FRANCIS BOYER LECTURES ON PUBLIC POLICY 9,11 (1984) ("Constitu-

tional scholarship today is dominated by the creation of arguments that will
encouragejudges to thwart democratic choice .... In a constitutional democracy the
moral content of law must be given by the morality of the framer or the legislator,
never by the morality of thejudge."); Robert H. Bork, NeutralPrinciplesand SomeFirst
Amendment Problems,47 IND. L.J. 1, 2-4 (1971) (asserting as "a 'given' in our society"
that "in wide areas of life majorities are entitled to rule for no better reason than that
they are majorities"); Edwin Meese III, Speech Before the American Bar Association
(July 9, 1985), in FEDERALIST SOCIETY, THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR

WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 1, 9-10 (1986) ("This belief in a Jurisprudence of Original
Intention also reflects a deeply rooted commitment to the idea of democracy.");
Edwin Meese III, Address-Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 22, 29
(1985) (claiming that ajurisprudence of original intention "is very much concerned
with process, and ... seeks to depoliticize the law"); Richard A. Posner, The
Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 4, 21-22 (1987) ("any
form of aggressive constitutionalism -. . diminishes the role of democracy"); James
B. Thayer, The Originand Scope of the American Doctrine of ConstitutionalLaw, 7 Harv.
L. Rev. 129, 149-52 (1893) (noting that when revising legislative enactments, courts
intrude into the "political conduct of government").
10 As Woodrow Wilson observed some time ago, "[t]he natural, the inevitable
tendency of every system of self-government like our own and the British is to exalt
the representative body, the people's parliament, to a position of absolute supremacy." WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN
PoLrfICs 203 (World Publishing ed. 1983) (1885).
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to some of the criminal procedure decisions of the Warren
Court, 11 and the recurrent, though largely unsuccessful, efforts in
Congress to impose various limitations on the jurisdiction and
remedial authority of the federal courts. 12 It would indeed be
surprising if the Senate were to decide to resolve such long-standing
turf battles by abandoning the field to the judiciary.
But there are other reasons for thinking that the pronouncement of the Senate that rejected Bork was not the last word on the
place of original intention in our constitutional jurisprudence. It is
not cynical to observe that, had the Senate majority been of the
same political party as the President, the great seminar on interpretivism would never even have occurred. It is, perhaps, cynical
(but no less accurate) to suggest that behind the positions taken by
Senators on overarching constitutional principles, there lurked
concerns over constituents' views respecting the outcomes, however
theoretically justified, of cases involving particular issues. The
issues that next time arouse the interests of voters, and thus of
Senators, may be something other than those of privacy and
11 For example, Title II § 701 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 210, 210-11 (1968), along with an earlier
amendment, Pub. L. No. 85-269, 71 Stat. 595, 595-96 (1957) (together, codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§3500-3502 (1988)), effected legislative reversals, or at least
reduced the impact, of three Supreme Court holdings: United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967) (finding that an accused is entitled to have counsel present at a postindictment lineup); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring procedural
safeguards to ensure protection of the Fifth Amendment rights of criminal suspects);
andJencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957) (holding that a defendant is entitled
to subpoena F.B.I. reports in the government's possession). Another example may
be found in Title VII § 702(a) of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 935-36 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3504
(1988)), which imposed a five-year limitations period on the exercise of the right,
recognized by the Court in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), to
prevent the admission of statements made by a criminal defendant at the time of an
unlawful arrest.
12 Among the various proposals of this sort, none of which was enacted, were the
following: S. 951, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1981), which proposed that federal courts be
prohibited from issuing desegregation orders involving busing beyond a neighborhood school; H.R. 867,97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), which proposed the elimination
of federal courtjurisdiction in abortion cases; H.R. 326,97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981),
which proposed the elimination of federal courtjurisdiction in public school prayer
cases; H.R. 14,553, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), which proposed limitations on the
allowable scope of busing orders (see Arthur J. Goldberg, The Administration'sAntiBusing Proposals-PoliticsMakes Bad Law, 67 NW. U. L. REV. 319 (1972); Note, The
Nixon BusingBillsand CongressionalPower, 81 YALE L.J. 1542 (1972)); and H.R. 11,926,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), which proposed the elimination of federal court
jurisdiction over state legislative apportionment cases (see Robert B. McKay, Cour
Congress, and Reapportionment, 63 MICH. L. REV. 255, 268 (1964)).
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autonomy in matters of sex and reproduction which were the
principal focus of attention in the Bork, Kennedy, and Souter
confirmation hearings. What the opinion polls show to be the
prevailing matters of public concern may well be dispositive of any
future Senate's attitude regardingjudicial competence to resolve the
constitutional questions involved in such matters. Interpretivism
may, at such a time, prove more popular with Senators than it did
in 1987.13
Despite its apparent decisiveness for the strategy and tactics of
the nomination process-a legacy of nominees who have left no such
conspicuous pre-nomination paper trail as Bork's, and have come
before the Senate anxious to avoid articulating anything like a
philosophy of constitutional interpretation-the great seminar on
methods of constitutional adjudication was, as to the merits of the
case, inconclusive. That is not to say that it was unimportant: quite
the contrary, it marked the continuation, in a most public arena, of
contention over the proper interpretive stance of the Article I
judiciary in constitutional cases, a conflict which has raged unceasingly since Marbury v. Madison14 was decided in 1803. This conflict
has, moreover, commanded more serious academic attention in
recent years than at any time in the past.' 5 This level of scholarly
" The lecture from which this paper is adapted was delivered prior to the
nomination of Clarence Thomas to be an Associatejustice. The author was a witness
at the hearings on his confirmation. The subject matter of those hearings and the
manner in which they were conducted will undoubtedly be the subject of extensive
commentary, most of it, one may anticipate, critical. For present purposes, it need
only be observed that nothing in this latest round of confirmation hearings suggested
the need for any change in the general evaluation offered above.
14 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
15 See, e.g.,JOHN AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1984); RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE
CONSTIrUTION (1987); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL
POLITICAL PROCESS (1980); ROBERT L. CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON ANDJUDICIAL
REVIEW (1989); ELY, supra note 9; MICHAEL G. KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD
Go BY ITSELF (1986); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND
HUMAN RIGHTS (1982); DAVID AJ. RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1989) [hereinafter, RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS]; DAVID A.J. RICHARDS,
TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1986); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE NEW RIGHT
AND THE CONSTITUTION (1990);JACK M. SOSIN, THE ARISTOCRACY OF THE LONG ROBE
(1989); CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW (1986).
A far-from-complete list of the extensive law review commentary includes Bruce
A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE LJ. 1013
(1984); Paul Brest, The FundamentalRights Controversy: The Essential Contradictionsof
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981); Paul Brest, The
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interest suggests that the debate over intentionalism will therefore
continue. So long as it does, it will remain politically and intellectually significant because it calls into question, and elicits defenses of,
the legitimacy of our most symbolically important political institution. An independent judiciary exercising the power of judicial
review has been the unique American contribution to political
science-to political philosophy, if you prefer. Thus, it is worthwhile
reflecting upon the challenges raised by those who espouse
intentionalism as the only true creed.

Misconceived Questfor OriginalUnderstanding,60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980) [hereinafter
Brest, Misconceived Quest]; Robert A. Burt, ConstitutionalLaw and the Teaching of the
Parables,93 YALE L.J. 455 (1984); Stephen L. Carter, ConstitutionalAdjudication and
the Indeterminate Text: A PreliminaryDefense of an Impeifect Muddle, 94 YALE L.J. 821
(1985); Erwin Chemerinsky, Wrong Questions Get Wrong Answers: An Analysis of
ProfessorCarter'sApproach toJudicialReview, 66 B.U. L. REV. 47 (1986); Harry M. Clor,
JudicialStatesmanship and ConstitutionalInterpretation, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 397 (1985);
Richard H. Fallon,Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of ConstitutionalInterpretation,
100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987); C. Edward Fletcher III, PrincipalistModels in the
Analysis of Constitutional and Statutory Texts, 72 IOWA L. REV. 891 (1987); John J.
Gibbons, JudicialReview of the Constitution,48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 963 (1987); Lino A.
Graglia,Judicial Review on the Basis of "RegimePrinciples : A PrescriptionforGovernment
byJudges, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 435 (1985); Joseph D. Grano,JudicialReview and a Written
Constitution in a Democratic Society, 28 WAYNE L. REv. 1 (1981); Richard S. Kay,
Adherence to the OriginalIntention in ConstitutionalAdjudication: Three Objections and
Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 226 (1988);Janet S. Lindgren, Beyond Cases: Reconsidering Judicial Review, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 583; John B. McArthur, Abandoning the
Constitution:The New Wave in ConstitutionalTheory, 59 TUL. L. REV. 280 (1984); Earl
Maltz, Some New Thoughts on an Old Problem-The Role of the Intent of the Framers in
ConstitutionalTheory, 63 B.U. L. REV. 811 (1983); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme
Cour 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1986);
William E. Nelson, History andNeutrality in ConstitutionalAdjudication,72 VA. L. REV.
1237 (1986); Gene R. Nichol, Children of Distant Fathers: Sketching an Ethos of
Constitutional Liberty, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1305; H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for
Originalists,73 VA. L. REV. 659 (1987); Ronald D. Rotunda, OriginalInten the View
of the Framers, and the Role of the Ratifiers, 41 VAND. L. REV. 507 (1988); Louis M.
Seidman, Public Principle and Private Choice: The Uneasy Case for a Boundary
Maintenance Theory of ConstitutionalLaw, 96 YALE L.J. 1006 (1987); Suzanna Sherry,
The Founders' Unwritten Constitution,54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1127 (1987); Larry G. Simon,
The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist Interpretation Be
Justified?,73 CAL. L. REV. 1482 (1985); Symposium: ConstitutionalAdjudication and
Democratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 259 (1981); Symposium: JudicialReview and the
Constitution-The Text and Beyond, 8 U. DAYrON L. REv. 443 (1983).
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I. THE CONSTITUTION AS LAW: LESSONS OF POSITIVISM

Intentionalism is grounded in a positivist or authoritative
jurisprudential perspective on the nature and sources of law. For
the positivist, all law is no more than the expressed will of some
authoritative sovereign, and nothing is law that does not fit this
definition. Judges, on this view, are no more than spokespersons
16
for lawmakers external to themselves.
The element of positivism in intentionalism is evident in Bork's
presentation of the role of the judge:
If the Constitution is law, then presumably its meaning, like
that of all other law, is the meaning the lawmakers were understood to have intended. If the Constitution is law, then presumably, like all other law, the meaning the lawmakers intended is as
binding upon judges as it is upon legislatures and executives.
There is no other sense in which the
Constitution can be what
17
article VI proclaims it to be: "Law."
What does it mean to say that a judge is bound by law? It
means he is bound by the only thing that can be called law, the
principles of the text, whether Constitution or statute, as generally
18
understood at the enactment.
The positivist jurisprudence espoused by Bork has the great
virtue of bringing to philosophical discussions a needed splash of
the cold water of reality. By reminding us that there is an element
of will in law, it calls our attention to the fact that one cannot
divorce law from effective sanction, and that sanction cannot be
effective without a capacity and a willingness on the part of the
sovereign to use its authority to impose it. 19 The authority behind
16 Ezra Thayer gave us a useful description of positivism:
[For the positivist, a] law... is a general command issued by the sovereign
power in any state to political inferiors, and enforced by a sanction. No
rule, whatever its nature, is properly called a law if it lacks any of these
essential features. The type of law in this sense is written statute law, the
express command of the sovereign. A body of customary rules, such as the
common law, is brought within the definition by the maxim that what the
sovereign permits he commands. Thejudge who administers the common
law is regarded as the sovereign's agent, with a delegated power of oblique
legislation.
Ezra R. Thayer, JudicialLegislation: Its Legitimate Function in the Development of the
Common Law, 5 HARV. L. REV. 172, 173 (1892).
17 ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 145 (1990).
18 Id. at 5.
19 The term "sovereign" as used here means a political organization having the
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the law, however, is that of the repository of contemporarysovereignty; in our system of government, this refers to the collective voice
of those temporary agents whom the people periodically designate
as the repositories of legislative authority. If those agents are
dissatisfied with a common law rule, they will displace it by statute;
no longer enforced, such a rule is no longer law. If those agents are
dissatisfied with a judicial interpretation of a statute, they will
change it by amendment; the old understanding loses all authority,
displaced by a new one. On this view, law does indeed represent
the will of an authority external to the judges, to which the judge
should defer precisely because it is authoritative.
Recognizing the claims of positivism does not necessarily
commit one to an intentionalist theory of interpretation. But such
an approach does sit comfortably with our American version of
democratic theory. Despite renewed scholarly interest in Aristotelian republican theory, which emphasizes individual participation in
self-government, 20 our system is not so much republican as it is
representative.
Its one essential feature is the periodicity of
representation: legislators, and the chief executives who participate
in the legislative process by virtue of their veto powers, are
designated as the agents of the sovereign people only for defined
terms, and lack power to bind their successors. 21 This is a feature
of all our written constitutions, state and federal, and we would
regard as illegitimate an effort by incumbent legislators to extend
their own terms or to entrench against their successors their own
policy choices.
This basic principle of American government
strongly supports, I suggest, the correctness of an original intentionalist stance with respect to the interpretation of statutes.22 Such a

ability to maintain a practical monopoly in the use of force to effect sanctions in a
defined geographic area.
20 For leading examples, see Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE LJ. 1493
(1988), and Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988).
21 SeeJulian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and
Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. REs.J. 381, 403-05; see alsoJulian N. Eule,Judicial
Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1558-59 (1990) (arguing for stricter
judicial review of laws enacted by substitutive plebiscites because they bypass
constitutional representational valves which filter the majority's will).
22 Discernment of the original intention even of legislators, however, presents
problems as well. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 313-54 (1986) (noting the

difficulty later interpreters face in determining the intent, premises, and purposes of
legislators with respect to the statutes they enact); Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections
on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 527, 538-40 (1947) (arguing that judges
ought not to be concerned with "delv[ing] into the mind of legislators or their
draftsmen, or committee members").
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stance acknowledges both the present authority of the representative branches to make rules that bind judges and the authority of
23
their successors in office to change those rules.
When we consider constitutional law, however, positivism and
its original intentionalist corollary contribute to the discussion not
a splash of the cold water of reality, but rather, a hot gust of legal
fiction. The positivist fiction is that the Founders-meaning either
the Constitutional Convention in 1787, or the First Congress which
drafted the Bill of Rights, or the Thirty-Ninth Congress which
drafted the Fourteenth Amendment, or the state conventions and
legislatures which ratified these efforts-were as much the representatives of the sovereign people, and thus have as legitimate a claim
to sovereign lawmaking authority, as any temporary incumbents in
government. The (equally fictive) intentionalist corollary is that
contemporary judges owe the same deference to the intentions of
the Founders that they owe to those of contemporary legislators.
Acceptance of this story requires some degree of suspension of
critical reasoning, for the indisputable fact remains that in the hereand-now, the Founders' law cannot be divorced from sanction. The
sanction behind constitutional law is not derived from the longdeceased Founders, whose only present power is to intercede for us
in heaven. The sanction of constitutional law-and thus the status
of the Constitution as law-is entirely dependent upon the will of
those who presently embody the sovereign authority of the people:
the temporary agents in control of an effective government. That
government may choose to enforce the constitution as its law, but
this choice is not preordained by virtue of some authority in the
Founders to make law binding on future generations. The document provides in Article VI that it is itself "the supreme Law of the
Land," 24 but it gains no authority as law from these words-rather,
it is law only insofar as the present political community is willing to
enforce it as such.
The legislators of the founding generation were realistic in this
respect when they passed the statute authorizing the federal
executive to use armed force to enforce the judgments of federal
23 1 put to one side the difficulty posed by linguistic skeptics who question our

ability to derive fixed intention from a text. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Law as
Literature, 60 TEx. L. REv. 373 (1982); Mark V. Tushnet, A Note on the Revival of
Textualism in Constitutional Theoiy, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 683 (1985); Mark Tushnet,
Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and NeutralPrinciples, 96
HARV. L. REv. 781 (1983).

24 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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they appreciated that the judicial power of the United

States to which Article III referred would come to nothing if
separated from the power possessed by the entire federal government. Members of the Forty-Fifth Congress, who in 1878 voted to
forbid the use of federal troops for ordinary law enforcement
purposes, were similarly realistic: they fully appreciated how much
harder they were making it for courts to see to it that the Fourteenth Amendment was observed as part of this country's "supreme
26
Law."
Once we recognize that the status of the Constitution as law
depends upon the political Will of a present political community, we
must face the question why that community should so commit itself.
It is here, in answering this question by counseling us to embrace
the Founders' law simply because it is the Founders' law, that the
positivistic intentionalism that Bork and others advance as the only
justifiable basis for judicial review loses credibility. The purported
authority of the Founders to make laws binding on future generations should be no more convincing to the late twentieth-century
American mind than was the divine right of kings to that of the late
eighteenth-century.
Thinking members of the contemporary
political community must know that the traditional ground on which
the intergenerational authority of constitutions is placed-that once
upon a time our ancestors entered into a social compact on behalf
of later generations then only a lustful gleam in their eye-is no
more than a rhetorical device either to describe the result, or to
provide a framework for thoughtful speculation about the nature of
political society.2 7 The Founders were not representative in the
sense that the President and the Congress are representative. If
25 See Act of Feb. 28, 1795, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 424 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.
§ 332 (1988)); see alsoJohnJ. Gibbons, FederalLaw and the State Courts 1790-1860,36
RuTGERs L. REV. 399, 401 n.3 (1984) (describing the role that a similar predecessor
statute (Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264) played in suppressing the Whiskey
Rebellion in 1794). The 1795 statute was the source of the President's authority to
send armed forces to Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1957 to enforce a judicial decree
desegregating a public school. See Exec. Order No. 10,730, 22 Fed. Reg. 7628 (1957)
(referenced in the historical notes following 10 U.S.C. § 332 (1988)).
26 The statute was the Posse Comitatus Act, ch. 263, § 15, 20 Stat. 145, 152 (1878)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1988)), which came about in response to
the constitutional crisis following the disputed Hayes-Tilden election. The complex
history of this act is recounted inJohnJ. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State
Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation,83 COLUM. L. REv. 1889, 1978-82 (1983).
27 Rawls, of course, deploys the idea of the social compact in this fashion, using
the mechanism of the veil of ignorance to investigate the question of what rights
should be considered fundamental. SeeJoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE (1971).
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positivistic intentionalism is, as its sponsors urge, the only defensible foundation for judicial review of legislation enacted by the
elected branches, it is a singularly shaky foundation. If that is all
there is, there may be nothing; certainly nothing that can be
regarded as an adequate response to Thomas Jefferson's protest
against the intergenerational tyranny perpetrated by constitutional
28

permanence.

Thus, far from legitimating the Supreme Court's exercise of the
power ofjudicial review, positivistic intentionalism, thought through
to its conclusions, can in the long run only accomplish the opposite
result. We have no difficulty regarding our periodically elected
agents as repositories of legitimate law-making authority-they are,
after all, chosen by us, the present generation, to act in that
capacity. The process by which we elect them is a far-from-perfect
method of assuring that all contemporary voices will be heard.29
Imperfect as it is, however, the American electoral process does
strongly legitimate the regime, and confers on its acts the imprimatur of the people's sovereign authority.
28

"[N]o society can make a perpetual constitution, or even a perpetual law. The

earth belongs always to the living generation." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
James Madison (Sept. 6,1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMASJEFFERSON, 1789, at 395-

96 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958). Madison's response points out the structural difficulties
that would arise from too easy access to constitutional revision-an argument of
political expediency rather than Founder's authority. See Letter fromJames Madison
to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 4, 1790), in 16 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 17891790, at 147-50 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1961); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 313-17
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (arguing that attempts at constitutional
revision would most likely take place at times when "the ordinary diversity of opinions
on great national questions" had been stifled by a common danger, would be
incapable of providing a check on the popularly elected legislative branch, and would,
if resorted to too frequently, "deprive the government of that veneration which time
bestows").
21 It is generally conceded that incumbency, for example, affords a significant
electoral advantage which has the effect of entrenching current officeholders in
power, regardless of their party affiliation. As a consequence, "outsiders" have avery
difficult time winning elections; their (potentially) distinct points of view will thus
tend to be excluded from our system. Dissatisfaction with this state of affairs has
produced movements in some quarters to limit the number of terms a member of
Congress may serve. See Timothy Egan, Building on Mistrustof Officials, Voters in West
Tiy to Limit Terms, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1991, at Al. Of course, other democratic
societies-Germany, Ireland, and Israel, for example-insist on proportional
representation to ensure that significant minority viewpoints are not wholly excluded
from participation in government.
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But who elected the Founders?"0 The answer to that question
is plain: we did, if anyone did, and each prior generation has
before us, and if the Constitution is to remain a form of higher law,
each succeeding generation must do so again-for no one else can.
When I say that we elected the Founders, you may ask whether
this election is any less fictional than the supposed original social
compact which gave the founding generation authority over those
to come. A realistic answer to that question is yet another question:
how else can we characterize what we have been doing down
through the many years since Marbury in refraining from interfering
with the Court's assertion of the power ofjudicial review? Presumably we need not have been so accommodating: conceding that the
multiple supermajorities required to amend the Constitution are a
substantial impediment, this mechanism has always been available
to the representative branches, state and federal, and could have
been brought into play to curb the power of the judiciary at any
time.3 1 In addition, there is the clear textual commitment of
authority to the legislative branch to determine, by its control over
the jurisdiction of the Article III courts, what issues those courts
may consider.3 2 These very real powers have been exercised quite
sparingly, however. The fact that our periodically chosen representatives defer to the continued exercise of judicial review stands as
an ongoing contemporary election of the Founders as lawgivers-we
elect the Founders by endorsing the pronouncements handed down
by their present spokespersons, the Supreme Court. The law
30 Cf supra note 9 and accompanying text (noting the undemocratic character of
judicial review).
-3 The process has been resorted to for the purpose of overruling a decision of
the Supreme Court only four times. The resulting amendments and the decisions they
"reversed" are as follows: the Eleventh Amendment (1798) (responding to Chisholm
v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 363, 2 Dall. 419 (1793) (broadly interpreting the jurisdiction of
federal courts to hear suits brought against the states)); the Fourteenth Amendment
(1868) (responding to Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (holding
that African-Americans could not be deemed U.S. citizens)); the Sixteenth Amendment (1913) (responding to Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Pollock, 157 U.S. 429
(1895) (striking down federal tax on income from municipal bonds as an unconstitutional infringement on the states' power to borrow money)); the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment (1971) (responding to Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (holding
that Congress had no power to establish a voting age for state and local elections)).
32 See U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish."); see also U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, c. 2 ("[T]he supreme
Court shall have appellateJurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions,
and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.")
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attributed to the Founders is, after all, only the constitutional law
announced by the Court.3 3
This process of election-throughendorsement is cumbersome, but not significantly more so than the
entire complex system by which we periodically authorize temporary
34
agents to govern us.
The great outpouring of scholarship exploring theories that
justify judicial review thus serves the useful purpose of advancing
reasons why each succeeding generation should or should not
reelect the Court as the voice of the Founders. That scholarship is
useful toward this end, however, only to the extent that it is
convincing to the contemporary mind. A constitutional order
predicated upon our fictive consent to the will of the Founders,
which is what positivistic intentionalism amounts to, is not likely to
be so.a5 Unless something more is placed on the scale, the
Constitution as law must be found wanting. Convincing reasons
must be identified if present generations are to be persuaded to
""We are under a constitution, but the constitution is what the judges say it is
Charles Evans Hughes, Address before the Elmira Chamber of Commerce (May
3, 1907), in ADDRESSES AND PAPERS OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 133, 139 (1908).
3 By acknowledging Congress's primacy over the subject matterjurisdiction of the
Article III courts, I reject the thesis, first advanced by Justice Story in Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 330 (1816), that jurisdiction to decide
federal questions is necessarily vested in the federal judiciary. Reputable scholars
disagree, arguing that Congress has only limited authority in this regard. See Akhil
R. Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of theJudiciaryAct of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499,
1507 (1990); Akhil R. Amar, Reports ofMy Death are GreatlyExaggerated:A Reply, 138
U. PA. L. REV. 1651, 1651 (1990); Lawrence G. Sager, The Supreme Cour 1980 TermForeword: ConstitutionalLimitations on Congress'Authorityto Regulate theJurisdictionof
the FederalCourts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 42 (1981). Prominent voices have also been
raised in defense of the view that Congress has complete authority to determine what
shall remain within the scope offederajurisdiction. See DanielJ. Meltzer, The Histoy
and Structure of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569 (1990); Martin H. Redish, Tex
Structure and Common Sense in the Interpretationof Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1633
(1990); Martin H. Redish, ConstitutionalLimitations on CongressionalPower to Control
FederalJurisdiction:A Reaction to ProfessorSager, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 143 (1982). See
generally Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail FederalJurisdiction: An
Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REv. 895, 901-22 (1984)
(surveying the various arguments for and against the proposition that Congress enjoys
broad power over the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts). Those arguing
for a self-operatingjudicial power of the United States seem to me to lose sight of the
fact that control over the jurisdiction of Article III courts by the elected branches is
essential in order for the exercise of the power ofjudicial review by those courts to
be legitimate.
35 See Brest, Misconceived Quest, supranote 15, at 225 ("Even if the adopters freely
consented to the Constitution... this is not an adequate basis for continuing fidelity
to the founding document, for their consent cannot bind succeeding generations.").
..
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adopt the Court's version of the Founders' law as an expression of
the contemporary sovereign will.
A reason sometimes advanced for looking upon the Founders as
authoritative lawmakers is that the Constitution was an unusually
brilliant product of a particularly virtuous historical moment, a
prophetic moment in which inspired people agreed upon an order
of things-a constitution-which so completely accords with right
that it deserves to be treated as a form of revelation.3 6 Given such
a premise, judges would, or at least should, conform their rulings as
nearly as possible to the intention of the prophets. Like the fiction
of the forever-binding social compact, however, the fiction of the
Founders as prophets requires that we suspend our critical
reasoning to too great a degree. Although it is true that the 1787
Constitution was a genuine innovation in the processes of government, it was far more a compromise of what today we would
recognize as principle and virtue than an embodiment of either.
The federal structure which it entrenched, for example, has
occasioned many proud defenses, sometimes on the Aristotelian
37
ground that only small states can act with republican virtue,
sometimes as an illustration of the Whig principle that self-limiting
government serves to protect against tyranny.38 The reality is that
36 In The Tempting of America, Bork resorts frequently to religious imagery in
support of his intentionalist theses. The Constitution, he says, is "an object of
veneration, a sacred text." BORK, supra note 17, at 351. The very name of his book
evokes the biblical fall of Adam and Eve, an evocation repeated in the first chapter,
entitled "Creation and Fall," which commences with a reference to a Supreme Court
Justice's "covetous glances at the apple that would eventually cause the fall." Id. at
19. He refers to the Constitution as "[t]he orthodoxy of our civil religion," id. at 153,
and identifies "[t]he heresy that dislocates it" as "the introduction of the denial that
judges are bound by law." Id. at 4. He even asks for "devotion to the philosophy of
original understanding." Id. at 9. Conceding that it may not be feasible to turn back
the clock by overruling nonintentionalist precedents, he nonetheless urges that
"[t]here are times when we cannot recover the transgressions of the past, when the
best we can do is say to the Court, 'Go and sin no more.'" Id. at 159. The use of
such imagery by constitutional popularists is not unique. See, e.g., CATHERINE D.
BoWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA at ix (1966) (asserting that the Constitution was
a miracle, and that "[every miracle has its provenance, every miracle has been prayed
for").
37 SeeJ.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT 506-52 (1975).
38 Madison observed:
The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the
same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self
appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of
tyranny. Were the federal constitution, therefore, really chargeable with this
accumulation of power, or with a mixture of powers, having a dangerous
tendency to such an accumulation, no further arguments would be necessary
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we have a federalistic structure because one section of the American
Empire believed in a forced and the other in a free labor systemthe intricacies of that structure were a means of permitting these
irreconcilable systems of economic organization to co-exist under
the same flag. 3 9 Compromises designed to preserve something the
present generation universally recognizes as morally reprehensible
can hardly be credited by thinking people today as the product of
40
a virtuous prophetic moment.
One might argue that although the 1787 version of the revelation was incomplete, the Framers were far-sighted enough to
provide for its completion and perfection in the post-Civil War
amendments. In this version of the prophetic moment as justification for an entrenched constitution, the Founders in the ThirtyNinth Congress become the perfecters of the revelation. They
relate to the Founders in the 1787 Constitutional Convention like

to inspire a universal reprobation of the system. I persuade myself,
however, that it will be made apparent to everyone, that the charge cannot
be supported, and that the maxim on which it relies has been totally misconceived and misapplied. In order to form correct ideas on this important
subject it will be proper to investigate the sense in which the preservation
of liberty requires that the three great departments of power should be
separate and distinct.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Madison attributed this principle of government to Montesquieu. Id. See generally
HERBERT BTTrERFIELD, THE WHIG INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY (1965).
S9 Perhaps the best illustration of this point is the amendment provision in Article

V, which contains the proviso that "no Amendment which may be made prior to the
Year [1808] shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth
Section of the first Article; and that no state, without its Consent, shall be deprived
of equal Suffrage in the Senate." U.S. CONST. art. V. The cross references to Article
I, § 9 are to the preservation of the slave trade (d. 1) and to the capitation tax (cl. 4).
The latter, in turn, refers to the requirement that direct taxes be apportioned by
population, counting slaves as "three fifths of all other persons." U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 2, cI. 3. Equality in the Senate preserved for the slave states an effective veto over
other forms of legislation inimical, to their interests.
40 Indeed, our historical experience in the three decades prior to the Civil War
suggests that when an indisputable intention of the Founders-preservation of
slavery-is significantly at variance with the perceptions of virtue of a substantial
portion of the people of later generations, that intention will be rejected. Appeals
to prophetic Founders were made on both sides of the abolition debate, but
ultimately proved to be ineffective in preserving the 1787 version of constitutional
federalism, at least as such federalism was interpreted by the Supreme Court in cases
such as Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). For a description of
the slavery debate, and the abolitionist predicament concerning original intent, see
generally ANTISLAvERY RECONSIDERED (Lewis Perry & Michael Fellman eds., 1979);
Louis FILLER, THE CRUSADE AGAINST SLAvERY (1960); LOUIS S. GERTEIS, MORALITY
AND UTILITY IN AMERICAN ANTISLAVERY REFORM (1987).
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Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John relate to the Prophets of the Old
Testament. Those perfecting amendments, however, were not the

result of the 1787 Founders' foresight.
Rather, the political
structure that those Founders set in place was so rigid that the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, though
nominally adopted according to the forms of Article V, had to be
41
imposed by the winners upon the losers of a bloody war.
Although the Nineteenth Amendment enfranchising women may be
perceived by most as an illustration of the perfectibility of the
Founders' revelation through the amending process, only a minority
will be willing to swallow such an assertion with respect to the
Eighteenth Amendment's enactment of prohibition; the wisdom of
the Twenty-Second (limiting presidential eligibility for office) and
Twenty-Sixth (voting age at eighteen) is also far from unanimously

acknowledged. The framers of our Constitution, whether in 1787,
in 1789, in 1864, in 1919, in 1951, or in 1971, have been politicians,
no more endowed with virtue than are politicians generally. Some
of their decisions have proven over time to have been wise and

virtuous. Others have been both unwise and unjust. The prophetic
moment justification for regarding the Founders as authoritative
lawgivers to whose intention the courts must always defer turns out,
when subjected to critical reasoning, to be no more satisfactory than

the fictive social compact justification.

42

41 See MARTIN E. MANTELL,JOHNSON, GRANT, AND THE POLrrICS OF RECONSTRUCTION (1973) (describing the national political conditions in which the amendments
were written and ratified); JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE
SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION 131-52 (1990) [hereinafter MCPHERSON, SECOND
AMERICAN REVOLUTION] (describing how the experiences of the Civil War drove the
North to forcibly redefine concepts of liberty against state power); JAMES M.
MCPHERSON, ORDEAL BY FIRE: THE CIVL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 491-591 (1982)
[hereinafter MCPHERSON, ORDEAL BY FIRE] (describing how the first Reconstruction
Act conditioned Southern state readmission to Congress on ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment). The debate over the formal legality of the Fourteenth
Amendment, while of little practical consequence, has been lively. See, e.g., JOSEPH
B.JAMEs, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1956);Joseph L. Call, The
Fourteenth Amendment and its Skeptical Background, 13 BAYLOR L. REv. 1 (1961);
Ferdinand F. Fernandez, The Constitutionalityof the FourteenthAmendment, 39 S. CAL.
L. REV. 378 (1966); Pinckney G. McElwee, The 14th Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States and the Threat That It Poses to OurDemocratic Government, 11 S.C.L.Q.
484 (1959); WalterJ. Suthon, Jr., The Dubious Origin of the FourteenthAmendment, 28
TUL. L. REV. 22 (1953).
42 Bruce Ackerman argues that at certain "constitutional moments" the people
"place a constitutional meaning upon a sustained series of electoral victories and
legislative successes that is very different from the meaning ordinarily attached to any
single episode." Ackerman, supra note 15, at 1055-56. When the electoral victories
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So, let us conduct discussions about the legitimacy of judicial
review-of the Constitution as a form of higher law-on a realistic
premise; the premise that constitutional law is not the law of the
Founders, proceeding from the will of the Founders, but the law of
the contemporary sovereign agents -ofthe people, proceeding from
their willing acceptance of it as such. This premise is advanced not
as a reason for rejecting intentionalism as the appropriate rule of
interpretation, but only to blow some of the fog away. It permits us
to see that intentionalism is useful only to the extent that it
contributes to a convincing justification for continuing to tolerate
the authority of the Supreme Court to suspend the operation of
state or federal legislation. For some exercises of that authority a
reference to the Founders' intention may be all that is required.
For others, it may not be enough, if for no other reason than
because neither a subjective intention
nor an objective statement of
43
that intention is readily discernible.
II. A DIFFERENT INTENTIONALISM: A TEXTUALIST READING OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

There are, of course, varieties of intentionalism. One version
holds that what counts is the actual subjective intent of those
responsible for the constitutional text. This understanding is
implicit in, for example, the Supreme Court's setting of the agenda
for reargument in Brown v. Board of Education." Recall that the
are convincing enough that all three branches of the federal government acknowledge
a new constitutional rule, a structural amendment has occurred in a manner different
from the formal manner specified in Article V, but equally legitimate. Id.
Triumphant majoritarianism is thus the indication of a prophetic moment. What is
missingin Professor Ackerman'sjustification is an explanation of the reason why the
triumphant majority must have sustained a series of victories to establish the
legitimacy of its new insights. As Alexander Bickel observed, "[p]rinciples that may
be thought to have wide, if not universal, acceptance may nothave it tomorrow, when
the freshly-coined, quite novel principle may in turn prove acceptable." BICKEL, supra

note 15, at 177.

43 For analyses of the problems presented by a search for a historically valid
original intention, see Paul Brest, InterpretationandInterest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765, 769
(1982); Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 742 (1982);
Robert W. Gordon, Historicismin Legal Scholarship,90 YALE L.J. 1017,1023-24(1981);
H.Jefferson Powell, Rulesfor Originalists,73 VA. L. REV. 659, 660-61 (1987). But see
Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the OriginalIntentions in ConstitutionalAdjudication: Three
Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 226, 257 (1988) ("Adherence to the
original intention is neither theoretically impossible nor so practically difficult that
attempts at it are futile.").
44 345 U.S. 972 (1953).
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on the

question

whether "the Congress which submitted and the State legislatures
and conventions which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment
contemplated..,

or understood... that it would abolish

segrega-

tion in public schools."4 5 The same sort of intentionalism underlay the famous dispute between Justice Black and Charles Fairman
over the question of incorporation, a dispute which proceeded from
the common premise that the actual subjective intention of its
Amendment
Founders was dispositive of whether the Fourteenth
46
made the Bill of Rights applicable to the states.
" Id. at 972. On reviewing this evidence, the Court found that it was "[a]t best
inconclusive" as to the subjective intention of the members of the Thirty-Ninth
Congress with respect to segregated education. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 489 (1954). The Court suggested that the Amendment's history was
inconclusive because of the status of public education in the South, where
"[e]ducation of Negroes was almost nonexistent, and practically all of the race was
...

illiterate." Id. at 490. Although the Court's conclusion was consistent with the
prevalent narrow view of the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment at the time,

more recent scholarship, focusing on the brief period of Reconstruction, suggests that
the drafters were at that time perceived to have had broader purposes which were
later ignored. See, e.g., MICHAEL K. CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 216 (1986) ("[The final draft of
the Fourteenth Amendment] dearly protected national rights, not simply those under
state law."); ROBERT J. KACZoROwSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION:
THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876, at 1
(1985) [hereinafter KAczOROwsKI, JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION] ("Between the years
1866 and 1873 ... the lead theory- of national civil rights authority under the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments posited a virtually unlimited national
authority over civil rights."); Robert J. Kaczorowski, To Begin the Nation Anew:
Congress, Citizenship, and Civil Rights After the Civil War, 92 AM. HIsT. REV. 45, 68
(1987) ("Congressional framers of the Fourteenth Amendment... thought they were
reconstructing American government and basing it on a revolutionary constitutional
foundation, but the Supreme Court decided against this revolutionary constitutionalism in a reactionary resurgence of states' rights ... ."); Robert J. Kaczorowski,
Searchingforthe Intent of the Framersof the FourteenthAmendment, 5 CONN. L. REV. 368,
370 (1972-73) ("[T]he framers intended to provide the national government with full
authority over civil rights, which they believed to be the same as the privileges and
immunities of the United States citizenship."). The Freedmens Bureau certainly was
active in promoting education among the recently freed slaves by coordinating the
establishment of schools in occupied territory. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION:
AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUToN, 1863-1877, at 144, 602 (1988); MCPHERSON,
ORDEAL BY FIRE, supra note 41, at 398-401.
46 From this common starting point, the disputants reached diametrically opposed
conclusions. Justice Black's position, elaborated in his dissenting opinion in Adamson
v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), was that the historical record of submission and
ratification (which he detailed in a lengthy appendix to his opinion, see id. at 92-123)
indicated that those responsible for the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment
intended thereby to make the Bill of Rights applicable to the states. Id. at 71-72
(Black, J., dissenting). In response, Professor Fairman contended that the historical
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A different version of intentionalism focuses not on the
subjective intention of the Founders but on the words they used,
placed in their contemporaneous historical and legal context. This
version asks not, "What result did the Founders intend to bring
about with these words?" but rather, "What result can we reasonably
expect judges to reach when they apply those words?" 47 This
version, which I will refer to as objective intentionalism or textualism, is, I suggest, more useful than that which prompted the
Supreme Court's request for supplemental briefs in Brown I and the
Black-Falrman debate.
History in the hands of lawyers and judges is rather malleable.
Thus, an intentionalist approach to constitutionalism often will be
no more certain or objective in determining outcomes than would
an injunction to judges to decide cases in accordance with the value
judgments they see embodied in a given provision. The malleability
of a historically based intentionalism may be illustrated by reference
to the famous Slaughter-House Cases,48 in which the Supreme Court
interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment for the first time. The
plaintiffs were butchers who challenged the Louisiana law establishing a slaughterhouse monopoly, thereby preventing them from
working at their trade. Among other constitutional provisions, the
butchers relied on the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, arguing that these included a privilege
against abridgement of their rights to work and to enjoy the fruits
of their labors. A majority of the Court held that the Clause could
not be invoked to protect a citizen against the legislative power of
his own state, relying on what it contended was the intention of its
drafters to make no'essential change in the federal-state relationship
with respect to the protection of civil rights. 49 The dissenters
insisted that the Amendment's purpose was to afford national
evidence "overwhelmingly" contradicted Justice Black's interpretation. See Charles
Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original
Understanding,2 STAN. L. REv. 5, 139 (1949).
47 See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 430-31 (1985)

(describing how "linguistically articulated rules... exclud[e] wrong answers rather
than point[] to right ones.... An interpretation is legitimate (which is not the same
as correct) only insofar as it purports to interpret some language of the document
and ... the interpretation is within the boundaries at least suggested by that
language.").

U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
49 Id. at 74.
48 83
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protection for the "full enjoyment of every right and privilege
50
belonging to a freeman."
Examining the legislative history, one finds some evidence that
the draftsmen of the Clause subjectively intended it to refer to
certain specific fundamental privileges and immunities. 51 The
record of the Thirty-Ninth Congress is, however, murky water in
which to fish for any single subjective intention regarding the
appropriate resolution of the issues which would arise in the
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Black and
Professor Charles Fairman, looking at the same materials, drew
opposite conclusions. 52 Raoul Berger looking at those materials
concluded that Brown v. Board of Education and Baker v. Carr53 are
examples of judicial lawmaking inconsistent with the Founders'
intention. 54 More recent historical scholarship rather convincingly
suggests that Berger and Fairman are wrong about the intentions of
Republican politicians in 1864. 55
50 Id. at 123 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
51 I refer to those listed by Justice Bushrod Washington in Corfield v. Coryell, 6
F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230). Judge Washington's list was read
into the record by Congressman Howard, in an attempt to indicate what the opinion
of the judiciary might be as to the nature of the privileges and immunities of
citizenship. It included the following:
[P]rotection by the Government, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the
right to acquire and possess property of every kind ....
The right of a
citizen of one State to pass through or to reside in any other State, for
purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim
the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of
any kind in the courts of the State; to take, hold, and dispose of property,
either real or personal, and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions
than are paid by the other citizens of the State ... [and] the elective
franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the
State in which it is to be exercised.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866); see also CURTIS, supra note 45, at 92130 (analyzing arguments against the application of the Bill of Rights to the states and
concluding that the Thirty-Ninth Congress intended the states to be bound by the Bill
of Rights through the Fourteenth Amendment).
52 See supra note 46.
53 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
54 See BERGER, supra note 15, at 117-33, 245. I confess that I was not persuaded
by Professor Berger's arguments. SeeJohnJ. Gibbons, Book Review, 31 RUTGERS L.
REv. 839 (1978).
55 See CURTIS, supra note 45, at 100-05, 117-20; KACZOROWSKI, JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION, supra note 45, at 135-66; MCPHERSON, SECOND AMERICAN
REVOLUTION, supra note 41, at 131-52; cf. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 40-63 (1988)
(arguing that the intention behind the Amendment was to strike a balance between
providing full protection for blacks and preserving the existingbalance of federation).
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All these efforts seem to me somewhat misdirected. By 1864,
the role of the Supreme Court as the final expositor of the
Constitution as law had long been accepted. Thus, the relevant
inquiry is not what the Founders intended with respect to the future
resolution of such issues as school desegregation or voting rights,
but what meaning the Court could reasonably be expected to give
to the words used in the text.
Textualism, as distinct from subjective intentionalism, demands
an examination of language as well as context, since the meanings
of words often change depending on the contexts in which they are
used. A textualist approach to the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment would lead a judge to reason as
follows: first, the judge would take note of the Clause's placement
in the larger text of which it is a part-it appears in the second
sentence of Section 1. Thejudge would then notice that the Clause
protects the privileges and immunities of "citizens. of the United
States," a term drawn from the first sentence of Section 1, which
sets forth a definition of national citizenship, hitherto absent from
the constitutional text. The Slaughter-Housejustices reading Section
1 were certainly aware that it resolved an antebellum dispute over
whether national citizenship was derivative of state citizenship, and
that in doing so it necessarily overruled the resolution of that same
dispute announced by the Supreme Court in Dred Scott v.
Sandford.56 They must also have been aware that "privileges and
immunities" was not a term invented by members of the ThirtyNinth Congress, but was rather an eighteenth-century usage, which
had appeared in both the Articles of Confederation in 1777 and in
the original Constitution in 1787, although in neither case was a
definition provided.5 7
56 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
s' The 1777 usage provided that "the free inhabitants of each of these States,
paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all
privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states." ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION art. IV (U.S. 1777). The context in which the term appears impliedly
assumes that there are privileges and immunities associated with being a free citizen

of a state.
The 1787 usage omits the reference to paupers and vagabonds but continues the
exception for fugitives and slaves:
The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States.
A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime,
who shall flee fromJustice, and be found in another State, shall on demand
of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up,
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Recognizing that a specific enumeration of the privileges and
immunities of citizenship was not provided in the 1777, 1787 or
1864 texts, the Slaughter-Housejustices should reasonably have been
expected to look to an eighteenth-century listing of them; after all,
it was an eighteenth-century understanding that needed to be
restored. They could have found, I suggest, no source more exactly
meeting this need than the Northwest Territories Ordinance,
adopted by the Continental Congress in 1787.58

to be removed to the State havingJurisdiction of the Crime.
No person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws
thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or
Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be
delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be
due.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cls. 1-3.
58 Ordinance of 1787: The Northwest Territorial Government, I Stat. 50,51 n.(a)
(1789), reprinted in U.S.C. at XLIX (1988) [hereinafter Northwest Ordinance].
The Northwest Ordinance figured prominently in the argument in Dred Scott,
which provides another example of the difference between subjective and objective
intentionalism. Recall that Scott was a slave whose master voluntarily sent him into
a federal territory which was covered by the Northwest Territories Ordinance. Scott
contended that he was free by virtue of Article VI of the Ordinance:
There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said
territory, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes, whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted: Provided always, That any person escaping
into the same, from whom labor or service is lawfully claimed in any one of
the original States, such fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed, and conveyed
to the person claiming his or her labor or service as aforesaid.
Id. art. VI, at Ll. The fugitive slave proviso to Article VI did not apply, since Scott
had not escaped to the Territory; he was taken there voluntarily. The Court,
nevertheless, ruled in favor of Scott's master.
Judge Bork does not regard the Dred Scott decision as an example of originalism.
See BORK, supra note 17, at 30,33-36. He can hardly deny, however, that the original
intention behind the 1787 Constitution was to preserve slavery in states whose
economic systems were at that time predicated on forced labor. Nor can he deny that
Justice Taney espoused an originalist position when he wrote:
No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion or
feeling, in relation to this unfortunate race, in the civilized nations of
Europe or in this country, should induce the court to give to the words of
the Constitution a more liberal construction in their favor than they were
intended to bear when the instrument was framed and adopted.
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 426.
A textualist would have reasoned very differently. Language similar enough to
Article VI of the Ordinance to suggest a common origin appears in two places in the
Constitution: the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition of slavery is similar to the
Article VI prohibition, and the fugitive slave clause in Article IV, section 2, clause 3
is similar to the proviso. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII § 1; id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. A
textualist would suggest that the Thirteenth Amendment constitutionalized the rule
of Article VI of the Ordinance, while at the same time vitiating the efficacy of the
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The Ordinance was the product of long and serious study
concerning the creation of new states in the western territory
acquired as a result of the peace treaty of 1783. 59 The delegates
to the Continental Congress were, with respect to this new,
uninhabited territory, starting from scratch, and they addressed
fundamentals. The Preamble of the Ordinance proclaimed that
those fundamentals were to "be considered as articles of compact
between the original States and the people and States in the said
territory, and forever remain unalterable, unless by common consent."60 One of those unalterable fundamental provisions was the
prohibition of slavery in Article VI, but there were many more. The
Ordinance included permanent guarantees of freedom of worship,
of the benefits of the writs of habeas corpus, of trial by jury, of
proportionate representation in the legislature, of bail, of judicial
proceedings according to the course of the common law, and of
moderate fines.6 1 The imposition of cruel or unusual punishments
was permanently proscribed.6 2 There were permanent guarantees
that property or services would not be taken without full compensation, and that previously formed contracts or engagements would
not be interfered with.63 Even a recognition of the fundamental
value of education was enumerated. 64 Most of these guarantees
were couched in language borrowed from bills of rights which had
been adopted in certain of the original states after 1776.65 The
fugitive slave clause by omitting the proviso.
The Dred Scott Court also held that a descendant of an African, though born in
the United States, could not be an American citizen. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
at 406. That holding was flatly inconsistent with the text of the Articles of
Confederation which says that "free inhabitants" are entitled without regard to
ancestry to the "privileges and immunities of free citizens." ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV. (U.S. 1777). A textualist would have observed that Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendmentby its terms restored that eighteenth-century understanding,
by defining citizenship in terms of birth and nationality, not ancestry.
59 The Ordinance is discussed at length in JAY A. BARRETT, EVOLUTION OF THE
ORDINANCE OF 1787 (1891), reprinted in THE FIRST AMERICAN FRONTIER (Dale Van
Every ed., 1971); PETER S. ONUF, STATEHOOD AND UNION, A HISTORY OF THE
NORTHWEST ORDINANCE (1987); THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE: ESSAYS ON ITS
FORMULATION,
PROVISIONS, AND LEGACY (Frederick D. Williams ed., 1989).
60
Northwest Ordinance,supra note 58, pmbl., § 14, at L.
61 Id. arts. I & II, at L-LI.
62 Id. art. II, at L-LI.
6

3 Id.

64 Id. art. III, at LI ("Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good

government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall
forever be encouraged.").
65 See BARRETT, supra note 59, at 60-62.
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Ordinance characterized them as "the fundamental principles of
civil and religious liberty, which form the basis whereon these
66
[thirteen] republics, their laws and constitutions, are erected,"
and undertook "to fix and establish those principles as the basis of

all laws, constitutions, and governments, which forever hereafter
shall be formed in the said territory." 67 A textualist would go on

to note, as part of the context relevant to understanding the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, that the First Congress acted to
ratify the Northwest Ordinance in short order, and then proceeded
to copy it verbatim, except for the omission of the prohibition on
68
slavery, in the statute drafted to govern the Southern Territories.
What have we, then? The appearance in the Fourteenth
Amendment of the term "privileges and immunities of citizens;" the
use of the same term in the Articles of Confederation; the contemporaneous

effort in the Northwest Territories

Ordinance

to

enumerate the unalterable fundamental rights of free citizens; and
the plain purpose in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of
overruling Dred Scott with respect to the unconstitutionality of
Section VI of that Ordinance. With all of this, the Slaughter-House
Court could quite plausibly have decided that the use of the term

"privileges and immunities" reflected an intention to require the

states to recognize at least those fundamental liberties to which the
Continental Congress and the First Congress had attempted
unsuccessfully to bind some of them. Indeed, given the context in
66 Northwest Ordinance,supra note 58, pmbl., § 13, at L.
67

id.

68 A textualist, congressional reenactment of the Northwest Territories Ordinance
"to fix and establish those principles as the basis of all laws, constitutions, and
governments, which forever hereafter shall be formed in the said territory," id., and
enactment of the Southern Territories Ordinance, see TerritorialGovernment of Orleans,
Act of March 2, 1805 in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONsTITUTIONS, COLONIAL
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES

Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1371-73 (Francis N.
Thorpe ed., 1909), might have been characterized as laws "necessary and proper" to
carrying out the federal government's obligation to guarantee to each state "a
Republican Form of Government," U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, that is, one recognizing
republican principles. But, in Permoli v. New Orleans, 44 U.S. 671, 3 How. 589
(1845), the Taney Court foreclosed any such incorporative interpretation of the
territorial ordinances. Dealing with a municipal ordinance that prohibited the
exhibiting of corpses and the conducting of funeral services in any Catholic churches
in New Orleans, and that only allowed such funeral rites in a designated obituary
chapel, the Court rejected a claim that the ordinance was inconsistent with the
"forever unalterable" religious liberty clause of the Southern Territories Ordinance.
Louisiana, the Court held, was not bound by that statute after admission to the union
as a state. See id. at 695, 3 How. at 610.
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which these words occur, no other interpretation of them seems
plausible-certainly Justice Miller's reading of them does not. 69
Had the Slaughter-HouseCourt, then, been more truly intentionalist-more true to the likely meaning of the words in the context in
which they were used-the Palko-Adamson debate over whether the
Due Process Clause incorporated the Bill of Rights need never have
occurred.70 Yet, oddly, no intentionalist voices are raised today
for a reconsideration of the virtual elimination of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause from Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 71 The outcome of such an exercise in objective intentionalism would be unsatisfactory to the current generation of intentionalists, for they would find that the fundamental liberties referred to
in the Northwest Territories Ordinance are largely those which the
First Congress included in the Bill of Rights, and which in recent
years, an activist Court has applied to the states.
A textualist approach conscientiously applied in the SlaughterHouse Cases might not have produced a different judgment. The
Court, considering what rights in the eighteenth-century were
regarded as fundamental privileges and immunities of citizenship,
could reasonably have concluded that the right to engage in the
butchering trade was not among them. But by taking this approach
the Court would have produced a quite different precedent: the
Slaughter-House Cases would have stood for the proposition that the
protection of fundamental civil rights, whatever those rights may be,
is the responsibility of the national government not only in states

69

See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (discussing the Slaughter-House

holding). Justice Miller's majority opinion further held that the primary purpose of
the Fourteenth Amendment was to protect the rights of the newly freed slaves. It
concluded that there was a distinction between the privileges and immunities inuring
to state and national citizenship, and that state governments were responsible for
protecting their citizens' fundamental rights. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36, 77 (1872).
70 See BICKEL, supra note 9, at 100-11. For two cases epitomizing the incorporation controversy, see Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) and Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
71 Bork declines to discuss the issue, observing that "[t]here is no occasion here
to attempt to resolve the controversy concerning the application of the Bill of Rights
to the states." BORK, supra note 17, at 93. One may ask why not, if intentionalism is
a serious intellectual position. Coming as it does in the midst of a book devoted to
proving the merits ofintentionalism, Bork's unwillingness to take a stand with respect
to a constitutional issue as central as the incorporation question must be considered
suspect. His position with respect to the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
meanwhile, is indefensibly dismissive. The Clause is waved away as a "dead letter,"
id. at 166, a "cadaver," id. at 180, a "corpse," id., because Bork cannot ascertain its
meaning. He has not looked very far in an effort to do so.
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formed in the territories, but in all the states. Instead the decision
elevated the notion that the protection of civil rights was primarily
a state responsibility to the status of constitutional law-constitutional law that continues to produce problems six generations later.
One may question whether the different hypothetical precedent
suggested by an objective intentionalist analysis would have received
from subsequent generations greater or lesser respect as constitutional law than the one announced by the Slaughter-House Court. At
the very least, however, such a different precedent would have
avoided a great deal of analytical difficulty. Over the next six
generations, Justice Miller's version of the intention of the Founders
in the Thirty-Ninth Congress led the Court into an increasingly
more complex and less comprehensible effort to pour into the Due
Process and Equal Protection clauses meanings with respect to
fundamental rights which the chosen language of those clauses,
viewed in context, does not obviously convey. Had the Slaughter-

House Court not ignored the contextual meaning of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause, lawyers and judges in later generations
would have been spared the ordeal of grappling with such oxy72
morons as "substantive due process."

One question, however, would still have remained: why should
the late nineteenth-century Founders be accepted as any more
authoritative sources of law with respect to fundamental rights
which the states must recognize than were the late eighteenthcentury Founders?
III. THE CRAFT OF JUDGING AND THE PERCEPTION OF LEGITIMACY

At this point, judicial craftsmanship suggests itself as a possible
basis on which to found the legitimacy ofjudicial review. Alexander
Bickel had this in mind when he observed that "courts have certain
capacities for dealing with matters of principle that legislatures and
executives do not possess. Judges have, or should have, the leisure,
the training, and the insulation to follow the ways of the scholar in

pursuing the ends of government. " 73 Bickel's assertion is generally
sound.

Still, in many instances, "the ways of the scholar" do not

yield determinate answers to concrete questions; the constitutional
72 Michael Perry makes a similar point. See PERRY, supranote 15, at 62-63 ("Given
the import of the privileges or immunities clause, the equal protection and due
process clauses were, in a strict sense, superfluous.").
73 BICKEL, supra note 9, at 25-26.
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text is in some places so open-ended that it is fairly readable only
as a recognition that there are fundamental principles-values if you
prefer-on which our system of government rests. Bickel's appeal
to a scholarly tradition ofjudging suggests that by the use of reason,
sound values can be identified and right answers given to questions
about individual liberties left open by the constitutional text where
majoritarian political judgments would be flawed. 74 Thus, Bickel
was apparently more sanguine about letting the Supreme Court act
as "Platonic Guardians" than was Learned Hand. 75
The scholarly tradition injudging may therefore be a reason why
the elected branches of the government should defer to the Court
when it articulates fundamental values and states what results those
values suggest, but it is hardly a reason why the elected branches
must do so. Recognizing this difficulty of the nonself-executing
nature of judicial power, Bickel argued that the Court must be
careful not to undermine what authority it could command: "The
Court should declare as law only such principles as will-in time, but
76
in a rather immediate foreseeable future-gain general assent."
Where no such principle presents itself, Bickel counseled the Court
to resort to the passive virtue of avoiding any pronouncement on
constitutional law altogether. 7 7 The Court, on this view, becomes
a participant in the creation from time to time of a Lockean consen78
sus over individual rights.
This contemporary social compact, like the whole social compact
theory to which it is analogized, must, of course, be recognized as
a fiction, a rhetorical device to describe the fact that most exercises
of the power of judicial review are in fact accepted-grudgingly in
74 See id. at 239.
75 See LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958) ("For myself it would be

most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how to
choose them, which I assuredly do not.").
76

BICKEL, supra note 9, at 239.

77 Bickel explained his position as follows:
IT]he Court wields a threefold power. It may strike down legislation as
inconsistent with principle. It may... "legitimate" legislation as consistent
with principle. Or it may do neither....
When the Court... stays its hand... then the political processes are
given relatively free play.... To this end, the Court has, over the years,
developed an almost inexhaustible arsenal of techniques and devices.
Id. at 69-70. But see Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues--A
Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 6-9
(1964) (criticizing Bickel's position).
78 See BICKEL, supra note 9, at 30.
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some instances-by the elected branches of government. It is one
thing, however, to describe the Court as engaged in a search for the
correct terms of an ideal social compact; as an abstract characterization of judicial review, this will do as well as any other. However,
it is something else to say that having upon reflection and by right
reason identified what it regards as a just conclusion, the Court
ought nevertheless to defer to a contrary near-term majority
opinion-for nothing would be so likely to undermine the authority
of the Supreme Court. If the belief became general that the Court
was, on the basis of its (often uninformed) projection of public
opinion, picking and choosing when to apply the Constitution to
protect individual liberties, it is not likely the enterprise would be
regarded as legitimate. 79 Let the cat of prudentialism out of the
bag, and the people will have very little reason to accept the Court
as an authoritative expositor of fundamental values superior to
contemporary majority consensus. Bickel's prudentialism, while
clearly more realistic than Bork's Founders' intentionalism, fails as
a justification for permitting the Court to choose the values which
give content to the open-ended texts. If the Court is free to
compromise principle and virtue by bowing to the will of a current
majority, even if only to the extent of exercising discretion not to
decide, it becomes institutionally similar to the United States
Senate. The judicial competence in matters of principle on which
the special claim of the Supreme Court to expound the meaning of
the Constitution is based is thereby wholly undermined.
Bickel thus posed for us in 1962 the majoritarian dilemma which
others, notably Thayer in 1893, posed in the past. 0 What Bickel
brought to the discussion-largely missing before-was the recognition that constitutional law, like all law, depends upon the willing79 This is far from insignificant. As has long been recognized, any regime loses
authority with its citizens to the extent its decisions are perceived as illegitimate or
unprincipled. See DAVID HUME, Of the FirstPrinciplesof Government, in HUME'S MORAL
AND PoLrrIcAL PHILOSOPHY 307 (Henry D. Aiken ed., 1948) ("Nothing appears more
surprising... than the easiness with which the many are governed by the few ....
When we inquire by what means this wonder is effected, we shall find that, as force
is always on the side of the governed, the governors have nothing to support them
but opinion.").
80 See Thayer, supra note 9, at 155-56. Thayer argued that American citizens
should be made to appreciate "the great range of possible harm and evil that our
[democratic] system leaves open, and must leave open, to the legislatures," and to
recognize "the clear limits ofjudicial power." Id. at 156. Thayer also asserted that
"[u]nder no system can the power of courts go far to save a people from ruin; our
chief protection lies elsewhere." Id.
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ness of a present government to enforce it by sanction. Thus
compared to the intentionalists, he was quite successful in identifying the element of will in constitutional law and tying it to contemporary majority consensus.
What is missing in Bickel's justification for judicial review, as it
is in the intentionalistjustification and in all positivistjustifications,
is an explanation as to why minorities-losers in the political
process-should accept majoritarian outcomes which they perceive
to be fundamentally unjust. Majority support cannot alone
legitimate law. This was a point made in our time most eloquently
by Martin Luther King in his letter from a Birmingham jail. l
Apartheid is not wrong in South Africa merely because it is imposed
by a minority against a disenfranchised majority. Apartheid in the
United States was not right merely because it represented the will
of a majority (as, in fact, at times it did). Indeed, it was illegitimate
in both instances because we can by the use of reason conclude that
individual human beings are equally worthy of the opportunity to
participate in the good life afforded by an organized society. While
the element of will in law makes intentionalism jurisprudentially
useless asjustification forjudicial review, the majoritarian consensus
justification is incomplete. It fails to explain why it would be
illegitimate for minorities regularly to engage in civil disobedience,
82
or even forceful resistance.
81 See MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Letterfrom a BirminghamJai, in WHY WE CAN'T
WAT 76 (1964):
An unjust law is a code that a numerical or power majority group compels
a minority group to obey but does not make binding on itself. This is
difference made legal. By the same token, ajust law is a code that a majority
compels a minority to follow that it is willing to follow itself. This is
sameness made legal.
Let me give another explanation. A law is unjust if it is inflicted upon
a minority that as a result of being denied the right to vote, had no part in
enacting or devising the law. Who can say that the legislature of Alabama
which set up that state's segregation laws was democratically elected?
Throughout Alabama all sorts of devious methods are used to prevent
Negroes from becoming registered voters, and there are some counties in
which, even though Negroes constitute a majority of the population, not a
single Negro is registered. Can any law enacted under such circumstances
be considered democratically structured?
Id. at 83.
82 Committed to positivism, Bork artfully analogizes departure from the intention
of the Founders to civil disobedience, observingThe person who understands these issues and nevertheless continues
to judge constitutional philosophy by sympathy with its results must, if he
is candid, also admit that he is prepared to sacrifice democracy in order that

642

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 140:613

Although Bickel's attempted resolution of the majoritarian
dilemma was thus unsuccessful, it certainly proved to be seminal.
Indeed, it is the starting point for most modern scholarship
attempting to justify judicial review of legislation. Among those
attempts, John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust8 3 has commanded
considerable respect. Building upon the idea of majoritarian will as
the source of legitimacy for all law, Ely urged that judicial review is
appropriate only in those instances when the legislature acts against
minority groups who may be subject to prejudice and are thus
unable to successfully protect their interests through the political
process. 84
Ely's representation-reinforcing justification-unlike
value-protecting theories of judicial review-is, he suggests, consistent with the underlying political premises of the American system
of government.8 5 Intentionalists object that the process of political control of participation is dealt with in the Constitution
explicitly, and that the Framers did not authorize the Court to
second-guess that process.8 6
But the real deficiency in Ely's

his moral views may prevail. He calls for civil disobedience by judges and
claims for the Supreme Court an institutionalized role as a perpetrator of
limited coups d'etat. He believes in the triumph of the will. It is not clear
why he does not advocate rioting or physical force, so long, of course, as the
end is good as he sees the good. Such a man occupies an impossible
philosophic position. What can he say of a Court that does not share his
politics or his morality? What can an admirer of the Warren Court say if
the Supreme Court should become dominated by conservative activists?
What can he say of the Taney Court's Dred Scott decision? He cannot say
that the decision was the exercise of an illegitimate power because he has
already conceded that power. There seems nothing he can say except that
the Court is politically wrong and that he is morally justified in evading its
rulings whenever he can and overthrowing it if possible in order to replace
it with a body that will produce results he likes. In his view, the Court has
no legitimacy as a legal institution.
BORK, supranote 17, at 265 (footnote omitted). This argument misses the point. The
Court is a part of the government, acting on the government's behalf. If most of the
people believe that the Court is committed to a principled search for just limits on
governmental authority, most of the people will refrain from civil disobedience of
specific decrees with which they disagree. It is the availability of resort to such a
sober second look by an independent judiciary that legitimizes the power of the
majority to impose its will.
8s See ELY, supra note 9.
84 See id. at 151-53. Professor Ely's theory is a refinement of Justice Stone's
"discrete and insular minorities" notion, first propounded in the famed footnote four
of CaroleneProducts. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
n.4 (1938).
85 See id. at 101-02.
86 Robert Bork is typical in this regard:
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argument is more fundamental. The argument assumes that if the
political process is open to all, any majoritarian outcome is
legitimate. It implies that if, for example, men and women have
equal access to the political process, as in all the states they do, then
any majoritarian decision with respect to the regulation of sex and
reproduction ought to prevail; thus, if a majority consensus were to
emerge in favor of compulsory abortion as a means of population
control, a law implementing that policy choice should be upheld.
Yet Dr. King's point about civil disobedience was not merely an
appeal for participation or representation in the political process.
It was also a demand that the autonomy of each and every individual be respected. No doubt the Court's reinforcement of representation has a powerful appeal insofar as it promises majority consensus.
This means very little, however, to those who, despite the "fairness"
of the process, are the losers in it, and thereby suffer what they
perceive to be a wrongful invasion of their autonomy.
Attempting to supply what is missing in both Bork's and Ely's
arguments, more recent scholarship, building upon historical work
which displaces Locke's stress on individual rights as the dominant
eighteenth-century American ideal,8 7 has looked to republicanism,
the idea that we as a community are engaged in a dialogue, the aim
of which is to arrive at moral consensus. For Bruce Ackerman that
effort involves looking backward at constitutional moments in which
the political community agreed to change the Constitution by extratextual means.88 For Frank Michelman and Cass Sunstein, that
effort is forward looking, a self-revelatory normative discussion at
The fact that the United States Constitution has provisions that require

participation by certain groups and that we have a constitutional history of
steadily expanding the suffrage does not give courts any warrant to go
further than the Constitution already does in ensuring representation and
suffrage. That expansion of participation and suffrage was accomplished
politically, and the existence of a political trend cannot of itself provide the

Court with a warrant to carry the trend beyond its own stopping point.
How far the people decide not to go is as important as how far they do go.
BORK, supra note 17, at 196.
87 See, e.g., PoCOCK, supra note 37, at 527 (rejecting the "Lockean paradigm" and

suggesting that Aristotelian ideas about human virtue were "operative over wide areas
of thought in the eighteenth century" and "provided a powerful impulse to the
American Revolution"). But see GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 606-15 (1969) (documenting a shift away from classical
humanist premises and an acceptance of Lockean principles in eighteenth-century
American political thought generally and in the making of the federal Constitution
in particular).
88 See Ackerman, supra note 15, at 1049-72.
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the level of the community through which individual moral freedom
is also achieved. s9 Mark Tushnet, meanwhile, observes that, in
contrast to the traditional liberal view of individual rights as prepolitical, a republican understanding of human nature treats people
not so much as bearers of individual rights than as "social beings
who draw their understandings of themselves and the meaning of
their lives from their participation with others in a social world that
they actively and jointly create." 90 In Tushnet's republic there
would be a shared understanding about the relationship between
legal privileges and the public good. 91
This listing of the theorists of a communitarianjustification for
judicial review is far from complete. Moreover, the capsule
summaries of their theories are vastly simplified, and therefore less
than entirely accurate. But it is not the purpose of this paper to
present an extended critique of their efforts to replace Locke, Kant,
Mill, and Rawls with Hobbes, Machiavelli, and Rousseau as sources
of principle in our republic. 92 Rather, this emerging body of
scholarship is referred to for the more limited purpose of comparison with the legal literature attempting to justify intentionalism.
Putting intentionalism aside, what is common in the theoretical
literature about constitutional law since Ely's decade-old effort is the
recognition (1) that no theory which treats the constitutional text as
alone dispositive is in any way sufficient, and (2) that a historical
search for the Founders' fundamental theory of government will
produce evidence of conflicting traditions, one libertarian and
individualistic, and one communitarian and republican. Neither
tradition can be regarded as dominant.93 Both traditions suggest
89 See Michelman, supra note 15, at 17-36; Michelman, supra note 20, at 1526;
Sunstein,
supra note 20, at 1554-55.
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91 Id. at 276 (discussing the "mutual forebearance" which a genuine republicanism
might foster).
92 For two recent critiques evaluating the contributions of the republican revivalist

movement, see Richard H. Fallon,Jr., What is Republicanism, and is it Worth Reviving?,
102 HARV. L. REv. 1695 (1989), and Paul W. Kahn, Community in Contemporary
Constitutional Theoy, 99 YALE L.J. 1 (1989).
9s David Richards notes:
American lawyers' attitudes toward constitutional interpretation are
formed in American law schools in which isolation from the larger dialogue
of the university is self-justified on the basis of the lawyer's need to master
the autonomous legal traditions of bench and bar. Both academic and

practicing lawyers thus gravitate to positivistic conventionalism, which in fact
distorts the complexity of our interpretive practices and impoverishes the
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that the Court must engage in a reasoning process which looks
beyond the text of the Constitution in order to determine, as best
it can, what are the appropriate limits of governmental intrusiQn
upon individual liberty. If the issue is narrow and technical, resort
to plain meaning may be all that is required by right reason. If the
meaning is not plain, resort to historical context may illumine the
reasoning process. But if the issue is, as in privacy cases, a conflict
between community values and individual liberty, neither text alone
nor history alone will serve the purpose. TheJustices are not kings,
because the sanction behind the constitutional law they announce
is the will of the current political majority. They must, however, be
philosophers, for without philosophy they cannot convince the
current majority that their version of the fundamental law is in most
instances superior. There is an element of will in constitutional law,
but there is also an element of right reason.

contribution of the American law school and legal profession to what they
should maintain and advance: the best interpretive and critical thought
about constitutional interpretation.
The consequences of this failure are dramatically underscored by the
superficial approaches that academic lawyers like Bork bring to the critical
analysis ofjudicial interpretive conventions with which they substantively
disagree. Such conventions are, as already argued [supranotes 27-42 and
accompanying text], sometimes interpretively wrong, and it is a defect in
positivistic conventionalism that it fails to capture the kinds of important
and often true interpretive arguments that make this point and sometime
change the law. However, critical interpretive arguments of this sort require
the kind of critical education in both history and political philosophy that
often best enable lawyers to make such true, reasonable, and convincing
arguments. Even the most intelligent legal scholars, like Bork, lack this
training, and thus sometimes make their criticisms in quite intellectually
shallow ways that do them and their arguments no credit. Such scholars,
often moved by apparent failures in the Supreme Court to have adequately
discharged its interpretive responsibilities, become ideologues of fixed
positions on substantive issues, and advance neither their own nor the
nation's capacity to conduct reasonable debate over the central questions of
interpretive mistake that should absorb the reason, not the passions, of a
free people.
RIcHARDS, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 15, at 297-98.

